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ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
OF ABSENT PARENTS-SOCIAL SERVICES
AMENDMENTS OF 1974
by Barbara B. Locker
As of June 1974, over eighty percent of the children of families receiving
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) required the aid due to
noncompliance with child support orders by fathers' absent from the home.2
Child support orders have been enforced against absent parents in three
ways: (1) contempt proceedings;3 (2) a long-arm statute to obtain in per-
sonana jurisdiction over the deserting parent; 4 and (3) use of the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act 5 which permits filing a complaint in
one state and action on the complaint in the state to which the parent has
fled. Each of these methods, however, is time-consuming and expensive.
Further, each method is obviously useless if the parent responsible for support
has disappeared.
Although the states have historically been responsible for support of
deserted children,6 Congress recognized, in view of the increasing number of
children being supported by AFDC, that state programs were neither locat-
1. Generally the father will be the parent ordered to pay child support. Many
states, however, have imposed such a duty on the mother. H. CLARK, THm LAW OF
DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 488-89 (1968). The Social Services
Amendments of 1974 apply to the child's "parent." 42 U.S.C.A. § 651 (Supp. 1976).
2. SENATE FINANCE COMM., SOCIAL SERviCES AMENDMENTS OF 1974, S. REP. No.
93-1356, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
8133, 8145-46 [hereinafter cited as 1974 S. REP.; page numbers are those of the reprint
in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS].
AFDC was established "[flor the purpose of encouraging the care of dependent
children in their own homes or in the homes of relatives by enabling each State to
furnish financial assistance and rehabilitation . . . to needy dependent children . . . to
help maintain and strengthen family life ....... 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970). It is
estimated that there are eleven million recipients of AFDC.
3. A parent may be adjudged in contempt for failure or refusal to comply with a
support order. Sikes v. Sikes, 242 So. 2d 494 (Fla. App. 1970); Woodard v. Woodard,
172 Ga. 713, 158 S.E. 569 (1931); Burger v. Burger, 156 Tex. 584, 298 S.W.2d 119
(1957); Guercia v. Guercia, 150 Tex. 418, 241 S.W.2d 297 (1951). A prima facie case
is established by production of the original support order and proof of nonsupport. Ex
parte Carpenter, 36 Cal. App. 2d 274, 97 P.2d 476 (1939). However, present ability to
pay is essential to the validity of a civil contempt order. Ex parte Sedillo, 34 N.M. 98,
278 P. 202 (1929). Further, intent not to pay is essential. Pennsylvania v. Brown, 9
Ohio App. 2d 131, 223 N.E.2d 370 (1964).
4. See generally Friedman, Extension of the Illinois Long-Arm Statute: Divorce
and Separate Maintenance, 16 DEPAUL L. REv. 45 (1966).
5. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9C UNIF. LAWS ANN. 1
(1967); see notes 35-45 infra and accompanying text. For an excellent discussion of the
Act see W. BROCKELBANK, INTERSTATE ENFORCEMENT OF FAMILY SUPPORT (THE
RUNAWAY PAPPY ACT) (2d ed. 1971).
6. See generally 4 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS 56 (1936). The state has
an interest in the physical and mental well-being of its future citizens. State ex rel.
Stearns County v. Klasen, 123 Minn. 382, 143 N.W. 984 (1913). In addition, the state
has an interest in preventing the abandoned child from becoming a public burden. State
v. Thornton, 232 Mo. 298, 134 S.W. 519 (1911); Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 107
N.W. 379 (1906); Coler v. Corn Exch. Bank, 250 N.Y. 136, 164 N.E. 882 (1928), afj'd,
280 U.S. 218 (1930).
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ing "runaway pappies"7 nor enforcing support orders., Attempting to
ameliorate this situation, Congress passed the Social Services Amendments
of 1974.9 The Amendments provide for greater federal supervision of state
child support collection programs' ° along with creation of a parent locator
service" designed to make available records from all federal agencies for use
in ascertaining the current address and place of employment of the wander-
ing parent.1 2 Although President Ford signed the bill into law, he expressed
concern that the Amendments thrust the federal government into the state's
activities and that the parent locator service might be a violation of the
parent's right of privacy.' 3
This Comment discusses the background of -the law concerning child
support and the difficulty the states have encountered in enforcing child
support orders. The attempts of Congress to deal with the problem of child
support enforcement are examined and the various provisions set forth in the
child support section of the Amendments are explained. Next this Comment
analyzes and attempts to resolve some of the issues raised by these Amend-
ments,' 4 such as whether they constitute an impermissible intrusion into the
state's sphere by the federal government, whether the best interests of the
child will be served, and whether creation of a parent locator service violates
the deserting parent's right of privacy. Finally, this Comment discusses
whether the Amendments are a practical solution to the child support prob-
lem since the low-income parent they are designed to locate will generally
be unable to support his child no matter what penalties he faces.
I. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO COLLECTION OF CHILD
SUPPORT PAYMENTS FROM ABSENT PARENTS
At common law the duty of a parent to support his minor child was merely
a moral obligation; 15 a parent could not be held civilly liable in a suit by
7. See W. BROCKELBANX, supra note 5, for a discussion of the "Runaway Pappy"
Act.
8. Under title IV of the Social Security Act information concerning the wherea-
bouts of a deserting parent of a child eligible for AFDC may be divulged to a state
agency. 42 U.S.C. §9§ 601-06 (1970). Additionally, the parent's address may be
obtained from the federal social security records. 42 U.S.C. § 1306(c)(1)(A) (1970).
Finally, one may gain access to the files of the Internal Revenue Service. 42 U.S.C. § §
602(a) (21), 610 (1970).
9. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397 (Supp. 1976).
10. The Amendments create a separate organizational unit under the direction of the
Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW). This unit will
establish standards for state programs for locating absent parents, establishing paternity,
and obtaining child support payments. Id. § 652.
The estimated cost of the program is $40 million during the first year. In later years,
however, a net savings to the taxpayer will result as collection efforts succeed. 1974 S.
REP. 8159.
11. 42 U.S.C.A. § 653 (Supp. 1976).
12. Id. § 653(b).
13. 11 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, Gerald R. Ford 20 (1975).
14. This Comment examines the federal law generally and does not purport to
discuss specific state law.
15. Floyd v. State, 115 Fla. 625, 155 So. 794 (1934); Hooten v. Hooten, 168 Ga.
86, 147 S.E. 373 (1929); Baker v. Baker, 169 Tenn. 589, 89 S.W.2d 763 (1935). For an
historical discussion of the child's right to support see Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426,
97 A.2d 390 (1953).
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the child' 6 or in actions by third persons for the child's needs. 17 Eventu-
ally, statutes were enacted making failure to support a minor child a criminal
offense and allowing the child to sue to compel his parent to support him.' 8
The duty of support is now recognized as a continuing duty which remains
with the parent unless removed or shifted in some way recognized by law.' 9
A. Obtaining In Personam Jurisdiction
Difficulties in collecting child support from a defaulting parent are
compounded when the parent either disappears or leaves the state in which
the support order was granted20 because enforcement of the support order
requires acquisition of in personam jurisdiction. 2' If a parent is a non-
resident, the court may obtain service of process only within the forum state
or by the parent's general appearance in the suit. 22 Service by publication
has generally been held to be insufficient. 28  Thus, the dependent will usually
16. Cf. Glaze v. Hart, 225 Mo. App. 1205, 36 S.W.2d 684 (1931) (father could be
criminally liable for failure to support minor child but the child could not sue).
17. Early judicial opinions interpreted the duty of support as giving rise to quasi-
contractual liability to third parties seeking reimbursement for necessaries furnished the
child, but the suit could apply only to past support and not to a future award. See, e.g.,
Saltzman v. Saltzman, 189 F. Supp. 36 (E.D. Pa. 1960); Cartwright v. Juvenile Court,
172 Tenn. 626, 113 S.W.2d 754 (1938); Garza v. Garza, 209 S.W.2d 1012 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1948, no writ). Often the remedy was unworkable since difficulty arose
in determining precisely what was "necessary." Hence, a merchant might be furnishing
goods at his own risk. Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n v. Clayburgh, 145 Misc.
403, 260 N.Y.S. 194 (New York City City Ct. 1932). Furthermore, a clear and palpable
omission on the parent's part often needed to be shown. Watkins v. Medical & Dental
Fin. Bureau, Inc., 101 Ariz. 580, 422 P.2d 696 (1967); Charbonneau v. Norton, 263 Ill.
App. 341 (1931); Griston v. Stousland, 186 Misc. 201, 60 N.Y.S.2d 118 (Sup. Ct. 1946).
18. See generally H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 188; C. VERNIER, supra note 6, at 66.
One purpose of these statutes was to enforce by threat of criminal punishment the civil
duty of the parent to support his child. Miller v. Commonwealth, 225 Ky. 576, 9
S.W.2d 706 (1928); State v. Bell, 184 N.C. 701, 115 S.E. 190 (1922). However, one
authority states that the fear of jail does not induce a low-income father to share his
limited resources with a family he has deserted. Willging & Ellsmore, The "Dual
System" in Action: Jail for Nonsupport, 1969 U. TOL. L. REv. 348, 373. The authors
quote a study which indicates that the absent father complied with his support order to
some extent in only 18.3% of cases involving AFDC families despite widespread
legislation designed to enforce his duty. A second reason these statutes were enacted
was to prevent the child from becoming a public charge. Brooke v. State, 99 Fla. 1275,
128 So. 814 (1930); State v. Thornton, 232 Mo. 298, 134 S.W. 519 (1911). See also
note 6 supra. Some statutes were simply remedial in nature and were designed to secure
and recover the child support. State v. Waller, 90 Kan. 829, 136 P. 215 (1913); State v.
Bess, 44 Utah 39, 137 P. 829 (1913).
19. See, e.g., Huff v. Merchants Parcel Delivery Co., 106 Ind. App. 110, 18 N.E.2d
471 (1939); Tullis v. Tullis, 138 Ohio 187, 34 N.E.2d 212 (1941); Hart v. Hart, 177
Okla. 428, 60 P.2d 747 (1936). Thus, an agreement which either expressly or impliedly
relieves a parent of his duty to support a minor child permanently offends public policy
and is void. Warrick v. Hender, 198 So. 2d 348 (Fla. App. 1967).
20. Obtaining a judgment in child support cases often marks the beginning rather
than the end of the dependent's trouble. Despite legislation designed to remedy the
situation the parent can by simply crossing the state line effectively prevent his
dependents from enforcing support obligations. Murphy, Uniform Support Legislation,
43 Ky. L.J. 98, 111-12 (1954).
21. Glaston v. Glaston, 69 Cal. App. 2d 787, 160 P.2d 45 (1945); Dorman v.
Friendly, 146 Fla. 732, 1 So. 2d 734 (1941); Cohen v. Cohen, 17 Misc. 2d 427, 187
N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
22. If the parent has property situated within the state, however, a quasi in rem
proceeding will usually lie. Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917);
State ex rel. Nelson v. Williams, 249 S.W.2d 506 (Mo. App. 1952).
23. Adams v. Adams, 218 So. 2d 777 (Fla. App. 1969); Proctor v. Proctor, 215 Ill.
1976]
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find it impossible to sue in his home state and will face the expense and
inconvenience of interstate litigation. 24  Moreover, the possibility exists that
due to a difference in laws governing child support the forum state may not
award child support payments despite the right given in the dependent's
state. 25 If the dependent does manage to pursue the deserting parent to his
new residence, he may find the parent will flee the second state as easily
as he did the first. 20
In addition to the problem of obtaining personal jurisdiction over the
absent parent, the dependent may find that the full-faith-and-credit clause
impedes effective interstate enforcement of a judgment rendered in his state.
The United States Supreme Court has interpreted the full-faith-and-credit
clause as requiring a final judgment 27 and as not requiring the enforcing state
to offer the same equitable remedies (such as contempt) available in the first
forum. 23 Moreover, the Court has ruled that alimony payments are pro-
tected by the full-faith-and-credit clause only as to those payments which are
overdue; 29 not protected are those future payments, like child support, which
are still subject to the discretion of the rendering court 0 Consequently, the
275, 74 N.E. 145 (1905). See generally A. EI-RENZWEm, CoNFLicr OF LAws § 71
(1962). The Supreme Court has held that due process requires a defendant to be notified
of the proceedings against him in a manner reasonably calculated to give him a chance to
appear and defend. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314-
15 (1950). If the defendant is not personally served, the least the plaintiff can do is use
that method of service most likely to apprise him of the pendency of the action.
However, publication may be sufficient if the address of the defendant is unknown.
Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962).
24. See, e.g., Stanley v. Stanley, 271 A.2d 636 (Me. 1970).
25. Cf. Loeb v. Loeb, 4 N.Y.2d 542, 152 N.E.2d 36, 176 N.Y.S.2d 590 (1958), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959) (wife who moved to New York after husband divorced her
was denied relief for not meeting the statutory requirement of being a "New York
wife").
26. If the dependent is unable to obtain personal jurisdiction and is unable to pursue
the parent, he may still be given relief if his state carries criminal penalties for desertion
and nonsupport. Most states have enacted such statutes. See generally H. CLARK, supra
note 1, at 200-06. When the dependent's state does carry such criminal penalties it can
extradite the obligor as a fugitive from justice under the extradition provisions of the
federal constitution and statutes. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2. The federal statutes
implementing this section are 18 U.S.C. §§ 3182, 3194, 3195 (1970). Many courts,
however, have interpreted these provisions as applicable only to criminal acts committed
within the state. See, e.g., Hyatt v. People ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903); State
v. Hall, 115 N.C. 811, 20 S.E. 729 (1894). See also notes 49-51 infra and accompany-
ing text.
27. Alimony and child support orders are not final judgments since they are subject
to modification by a showing by either party of good cause and change of circumstances.
Due process seems to demand that the defendant be given "an opportunity to raise
defenses otherwise open to him" including the defense of change of circumstances. Griffin
v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228 (1946). See also Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183 (1901).
28. See generally Ehrenzweig, Inrstate Recognition of Support Duties-The Recip-
rocal Enforcement Act in California, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 382 (1954); Foster, The
Enforcement of Foreign Alimony Decrees, 4 S.C.L.Q. 341 (1952); Scoles, Enforcement
of Foreign "Non-final" Alimony and Support Orders, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 817 (1953);
Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 289
(1973); Note, Domestic Relations: Interstate Enforcement of Support Orders: Necessi-
ty and Feasibility of Federal Legislation, 48 CORNELL L. REV. 541 (1963).
29. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910). See also Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S.
216 (1934); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); Bates v. Bodie, 245 U.S.
520 (1918).
30. The finality test for enforcement of support payments has recently been subject
to growing criticism. The rationale behind this criticism is that courts should not let
states with laws favorable to the father become sanctuaries within which deserting
fathers may hide with impunity. Light v. Light, 12 111. 2d 502, 147 N.E.2d 34, 39
[Vol. 30
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dependent faces the expense and inconvenience of a multitude of suits since
he can sue only after payments have become delinquent.
To alleviate -the hardship caused by requiring the court of the dependent's
state to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the parent, many states 1 have
enacted long-arm statutes which permit the state of the matrimonial domicile
to obtain personal jurisdiction over the defaulting parent.3 2 Most of these stat-
utes are based on public policy since the dependent will be remediless if the
defaulting parent leaves the state with all his property and the dependent
is unable to pursue him and institute an action in another state. The state
should not require the dependent to follow the defaulting parent from state
to state when the dispute could easily and equitably be settled in the first
state.33  Another reason for the enactment of long-arm statutes is that the
state will have to support the dependent if he is denied relief elsewhere; thus,
the dependent's state has a greater interest in the adjudication of support
liability than does the defaulting parent's new state.3 4 Despite the desirabil-
ity of such legislation, some states have not enacted long-arm statutes giving
their courts in personam jurisdiction over absent parents; this often leaves
dependents without the support to which they are legally entitled.
B. Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
Possibly the best approach to collecting child support payments from
parents who have left the state is the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act (URESA).35 This Act permits -two-state suits: a complaint filed in
the dependent's state and an order for support entered in the state to which the
parent has fled. As a result, the dependent family is able to file a petition
(1958). See also People ex rel. Franks v. Franks, 126 111. App. 2d 51, 261 N.E.2d 502
(1970); Hatch v. Hatch, 431 P.2d 832 (Ore. 1967). A few courts now permit suits
based on non-final support orders. See, e.g., Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Cal. 2d 465, 283
P.2d 19 (1955); Rule v. Rule, 313 Ill. App. 108, 39 N.E.2d 379 (1942); McCabe v.
McCabe, 210 Md. 654, 123 A.2d 447 (1956). See also Note, Interstate Enforcement of
Modifiable Alimony and Child Support Decrees, 54 IowA L. REV. 597, 617 (1969).
31. Examples include FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(1)(e) (Supp. 1976-77); IDAHO
CODE § 5-514(e) (Supp. 1976); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 17(1)(e) (1968); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-308(b)(8) (Supp. 1975); NEV. REV. STAT. § 14.065(2)(e) (1973); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 21-3-16(A)(5) (Supp. 1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1701.03(a)(7)
(Supp. 1975-76); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-24(6) (Supp. 1975); Wis. STAT. §§ 247.057,
247.055(lm) (Supp. 1975-76). See also CAL. CIV. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973);
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-5-33 (1970).
32. Some states use the idea of "minimum contacts," analogizing the marital
relationship to the case where the individual commits a single tortious act which brings
him within the ambit of a long-arm statute. Thus, living in a marital relationship within
the state provides sufficient contact to justify extending personal jurisdiction. Soule v.
Soule, 193 Cal. App. 2d 443, 14 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1961). See also Mizner v. Mizner, 84
Nev. 268, 439 P.2d 679, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 847 (1968).
33. See generally Comment, Extending "Minimum Contacts" to Alimony: Mizner
v. Mizner, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 361 (1968). See also McDuffie v. McDuffie, 19 So. 2d
511, 512-13 (Fla. 1944); Wooton v. Wooton, 283 Ky. 422, 141 S.W.2d 561, 563 (1940);
Friedman, supra note 4.
34. See Friedman, supra note 4.
35. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT, 9C UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 1 (Supp. 1967). The Act is based on New York's Uniform Support of Dependents
Law passed in 1949 and later borrowed by ten other states. In 1950 the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws began reviewing all the current
laws and passed URESA. Most states have enacted URESA or a similar act. Id. at 9-
12. See also W. BROCKELBANK, supra note 5, at 4-5.
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in its state of residence (the initiating state); this petition will then be mailed
to the state where the parent is residing (the responding state). The court
of the responding state will then obtain personal jurisdiction of the obligor,
grant him a hearing, and, if it finds him liable for the support of his
dependents, determine the amount and collect the money by its ordinary
processes."1  The advantages of URESA are several: (1) the prose-
cuting attorney has a duty to represent the petitioner upon request of the
court or welfare official;3 7 (2) since financial need is not a prerequisite, any
person may file a petition in the local court of the initiating state;38 (3)
similarly, any person with legal custody of the child may file a petition with-
out the necessity of being appointed guardian ad litem;3 9 (4) if the court
of the initiating state has reason to believe the defaulting parent may flee
the jurisdiction of the responding state, it may request that state to arrest him
if allowed by that state's law; 40 and (5) the defendant may answer the com-
plaint giving any defenses he has to the suit.4 1  If a defendant does not
appear, or if he appears and admits the allegations, the court in the respond-
ing state may immediately determine the amount due and the time period
for payment. 42
Although URESA circumvents the necessity for a long-arm statute, it has
been criticized as inefficient and unworkable. In most cases the dependent
is represented by the county prosecutor's office, and the claim is frequently
given low priority. 43  Furthermore, the forum is often so distant that the
dependent will find it nearly impossible to travel to that state to testify.
Thus, the dependent must rely on a local officer with whom his only contact
has been a form sent by mail. 44 The petitioner must depend on the respond-
ing state to find the defaulting parent and trust its courts since all the evi-
dence is taken there.45 In addition the parent may have consciously chosen
to move to the responding state in view of its favorable laws regarding child
support. If an award is granted by the court of the responding state, it may
well be inadequate since the responding state is likely to be less sympathetic
36. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT §§ 20, 22. Constitution-
al challenges to URESA have been unsuccessful. For example, in Smith v. Smith, 125
Cal. App. 2d 154, 270 P.2d 613 (1954), the court faced the question of whether the
proceedings deny a defendant the opportunity to confront and cross-examine the petition-
er. The court found no denial of due process since the defendant had the right to cross-
examine by using depositions in the initiating state. See generally W. BROCKELBANK,
supra note 5, at 29-31.
37. UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 11.
38. The Act defines "obligee" as any person to whom a duty of support is owed. Id.
§ 2(8). See also id. § 8 which gives the state the right to invoke the Act to obtain
reimbursement for any support it has furnished a deserted dependent.
39. Id. § 12.
40. Id. § 15.
41. Id. §§ 20, 22.
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Nelson, Family Support from Fugitive Fathers: A Proposed Amend-
ment to Michigan's Long-Arm Statute, 3 PROSPECTUs 399 (1970). The author states
that in Michigan some 40% of URESA cases filed are never pursued. Id. at 405.
44. Comment, Enforcement of Support Obligations: A Solution and Continuing
Problems, 61 KY. L.J. 322, 329 (1972).




to the dependent than his own state. 46 Finally, URESA, as well as the long-
arm statutes, will only be usable if the deserting parent's whereabouts are
known, which often is not the case.
II. CONGRESSIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE DIFFICULTY OF
ENFORCING CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS-THE SOCIAL SERVICES
AMENDMENTS OF 1974
Congress early took note of the inadequate remedies available to depend-
ents when the parent chose to leave the state in which the support
order was enforceable. In 1941 a bill was first introduced which would
have made it a federal crime to leave a state with the intent to avoid child
support payments to a minor child. 47  In 1947 a bill was proposed which
provided for civil remedies for nonsupport and abandonment. It would have
authorized registration of orders made in the dependent's state, thereby pro-
viding for the subsequent enforcement of the order in the state to which the
parent had moved.48  In 1948 Congress passed the Fugitive Felon Act which
provides that anyone traveling in interstate commerce to avoid prosecution
for a felony under state law is also guilty of a federal offense. 49 Since most
states make abandonment and nonsupport a felony,50 the Fugitive Felon Act
should be widely applicable, allowing the FBI to join the search for the
deserting parent. This Act, however, has generally been considered inappli-
cable to many cases of child support defaults. 51 Additionally, the Act merely
incarcerates the parent which does not solve the primary problem of support
for the child.
A. The Social Security Act
In 1935 Congress passed the Social Security Act5 2 which was initially
designed to encourage state adoption of active public relief programs such
46. See Note, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Alimony and Custody Cases, 73 COLUM. L.
REv. 289, 306 (1973). The author states that the dependent may receive help if the
responding state has adopted the 1958 URESA Amendments. If the initiating state in
that situation has a long-arm statute, the dependent may be allowed to register the child
support order from his own state and the responding state will be required to abide by it.
Id. For a discussion of the problems faced by indigent fathers under URESA see
Willging & Ellsmore, supra note 18, at 356-60.
47. The bill was introduced in three successive sessions of Congress with no success.
S. 1265, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); S. 761, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); S. 453, 79th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1945). See also H.R. 1538, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949); H.R. 5974,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). These bills were similar to the earlier three bills and had
the same lack of success. See generally Note, Domestic Relations, supra note 28.
48. H.R. 4580, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949). Other bills patterned after H.R. 4580
were H.R. 285, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957); S. 353, H.R. 495, H.R. 5486, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959); H.R. 3968, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961). For a discussion of the
registration of child support orders see Legislation, Enforcement of Foreign Non-Final
Alimony Decrees, 18 VAND. L. REV. 830, 833-37 (1965).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1970); see note 26 supra.
50. H. CLARK, supra note 1, at 200-06.
51. The difficulty arises because the crime must be prosecuted in the district in
which it was committed, the dependent's state. Prosecution additionally requires the
approval of the United States Attorney General or an Assistant Attorney General. See
Note, Domestic Relations, supra note 28, at 549.




as AFDC.58 While states are not required by the Act to participate in the
programs, they are induced to do so by a reimbursement for state welfare
expenditures used in establishing state programs which conform to federal
guidelines. 54 One of the problems the Act undertook to solve was that of
nonsupport of children. For example, AFDC offers welfare payments to
families in which the father is dead, absent, disabled, 55 or, at the state's
option, unemployed. 56 When first enacted, AFDC primarily provided sup-
port for children whose father was dead.57 By 1973, however, four out of
five AFDC families were receiving aid because the father had voluntarily left
the home.58  When the father is absent, it is generally found that the
marriage has broken up or that the father never had married the mother. 59
The large increase in the number of welfare families receiving AFDC is
due partly to the incompetence and apathy of the courts, prosecutors, and
welfare officers in executing the laws already enacted.60 Some lawyers and
officials are actually hostile to the idea of the father's being held responsible
for the support of his minor children. 61 The failure of the officials is further
emphasized by the fact that often the father has not disappeared but is living
in the same county as his children and could be easily located. 62 Often the
father does not have many other children to support,68 and the amount of
the child support awarded is generally not large.64
In response to the lack of enforcement of child support orders which was
causing the ballooning of welfare payments, Congress in 1967 amended the
Social Security Act.65 Provisions of the amended Act require the states to
seek contribution from financially-able absent parents and to provide several
tools for locating such parents and persuading them to contribute. 6 The
State is required to use any reciprocal arrangements adopted with other states
to obtain or enforce child support.67 In addition, access is authorized to both
Social Security68 and, if there is a court order, Internal Revenue Service69
53. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
54. See generally Note, Aid to Families with Dependent Children-A Study of
Welfare Assistance, 44 DENVER L.J. 102 (1967).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17)(A) (1970).
56. Id. § 644.
57. The portion of the caseload eligible because of the father's death was 42% in
1940, 7.7% in 1961, and 4% in 1973. 1974 S. REP. 8146.
58. In 1961, 66.7% (2.4 million people) received AFDC due to the father's
voluntary absence, 75.4% (5.5 million recipients) in 1969, and 80.2% (nearly 8.7
million recipients) in 1973. Id.
59. In 46.5% of the AFDC families on welfare in 1973 the father was either legally
divorced or separated from the mother without a court decree. The father had never
married the mother in 33.7% of the cases (3.7 million recipients in 1973). From 1971
to 1973 there was an increase of 21.7% in the number of AFDC families in which the
father was not married to the mother. Id.
60. Id. at 8147.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. "Ninety-two percent of the nonsupporting fathers had a total of three or fewer
children." Id.
64. If there was a court order for support, it was generally $50 per month. In 33%
of the nonwelfare cases the order was for $50 or less. Id.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (1970).
66. Id. §§ 602(a)(11), (17), (18), (21), (22), 610(a).
67. Id. § 602(a)(17)(A)(ii).
68. ld. § 602(a) (21).
69. Id. § 610(a).
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records as aids for locating deserting parents.
Due to inadequate attention by HEW there has been little feedback on
the effectiveness of these state programs. HEW has neither monitored the
states' child support enforcement programs nor required the states to report
their progress. Furthermore, due to lack of regional staff, HEW has not
emphasized child support activities in its overall welfare program. The
Senate Finance Committee, in concluding that most states have not success-
fully implemented the provisions of the present child support law,70 stated
it "believe[d] that new and stronger legislative action [was] required in this
area which [would] create a mechanism to require compliance with the law."'71
B. The Social Services Amendments of 1974
On December 9, 1974, the House of Representatives passed a new social
services bill to amend the Social Security Act by adding title XX, dealing
with social services. 72  The Senate Finance Committee substituted the text
of an earlier bill,73 and on December 20, 1974, the House and Senate passed
the amended version, known as the Social Services Amendments of 1974,
which was signed by President Ford on January 9, 1975. 7 4  Under the
Amendments the states generally have the ultimate authority to fashion their
own social services programs since HEW "can neither mandate meaning-
ful programs nor impose effective controls upon the States."75 The states are
required, however, to provide information on their use of federal funds in
the form of an annual audit.70
Child Support Program. Although the states are allowed flexibility in estab-
lishing and administering most programs, the Amendments provide a very
structured child support program 77 which must be implemented before a state
70. 1974 S. REP. 8149-50. The Report bases its analysis on the March 13, 1972,
study of current child support programs performed by the General Accounting Office.
The Committee also surveyed about twenty states to determine the amounts collected on
behalf of AFDC recipients in 1973. The Committee found that the states of Washing-
ton ($7,706,000 collected), Massachusetts ($17,016,000), Michigan ($28,100,000), and
California ($53,000,000) had the best collection programs. For every dollar collected
the state's administrative collection cost was approximately twenty cents.
71. Id.
72. H.R. 17045, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
73. H.R. 3153, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); see SENATE FINANCE COMM., SOCIAL
SERVICES AMENDMENTS OF 1973, S. REP. No. 93-553, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
74. Social Services Amendments of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397 (Supp. 1976). See
also PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 13, at 20.
75. 1974 S. REP. 8138. Thus, the Amendments provide that the states will have
maximum freedom to determine which services will be offered, the eligibility require-
ments, and any limitations upon the services. This allows the states to structure
programs to meet their particular needs. Only a few programs are required to be
established before the state can get general funds for its own special programs. An
example is the requirement that there be at least three types of services for individuals
receiving supplemental security income benefits. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397c(2)(B) (Supp.
1976). This group includes the blind, aged, and disabled. 42 U.S.C. § 1381 (1970).
76. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1397b (Supp. 1976). The annual report should also provide
information on the extent to which social service funds were used for services to persons
not actually on welfare and the extent to which such funds were used to purchase
services from organizations outside the welfare agency. Burdensome and complex
reporting procedures, however, are not to be imposed on the states. 1974 S. REP. 8139.
77. 42 U.S.C.A. § 654 (Supp. 1976).
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is eligible to receive matching federal funds.78  To assist and oversee the
operation of state child support programs the Secretary of HEW is required
to set up a separate organizational unit under the direct control of an
appointee of the Secretary.7 9 The purpose of this agency is to review and
approve state child support plans,8 0 evaluate and conduct annual and special
audits of each state plan,8' and maintain adequate records of and publish
reports on the operation of the state's program.82  The agency also provides
technical assistance to the states to help them establish effective systems for
determining paternity and collecting child support.88 Additionally, if a prose-
cuting attorney or court in another state refuses to enforce an order against
a deserting parent within a reasonable time, the agency has authority to grant
officials in the complaining state the permission to sue in a federal district
court.84
Parent Locator Service. Another new provision of the Amendments is the
establishment of a federal parent locator service which has access to all fed-
eral records and will make them available to the states for use in locating
a deserting parent who owes child support.8 5 A state, however, must first
exhaust all means it has for tracing absent parents and enforcing child support
orders before requesting aid from the federal service.86 As a further aid in
location efforts, welfare information formerly withheld from public officials
under regulations concerning confidentiality is made available under the
Amendments. 7 The only limitation on the sources of information made
78. The federal government will match the state's efforts. The Amendments
increase the federal contribution from 50% to 75%. Id. § 655. However, states not
complying with the requirements would face a penalty in the form of reduced matching
federal funds for AFDC payments (the Secretary could impose a penalty equal to 5% of
the federal funds to which the state was otherwise entitled as matching funds for AFDC
payments made by the state in the year the audit was conducted). Id. §§ 603(h),
652(a)(4). A state will not be found to have an acceptable program unless it
adequately cooperates in obtaining child support payments from the absent parent of an
AFDC child. In evaluating the adequacy of a state's program the Secretary should
consider the effective implementation of URESA. He also should note if another
state has been forced to request access to the federal courts because the state under
scrutiny has failed to enforce a support order. 1974 S. REP. 8151.
79. 42 U.S.C.A. § 652(a) (Supp. 1976).
80. Id. § 652(a)(3).
81. Id. § 652(a)(4).
82. Id. § 652(a)(6).
83. Id. § 652(a)(7).
84. Id. § 652(a)(8); see notes 102-06 infra and accompanying text.
85. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 653, 653(b)(1) (Supp. 1976). The Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), permits disclosure of federal records to "any person" who
requests the information without a showing of need or particular interest. However,
release of information concerning an absent parent would be limited since the Freedom
of Information Act provides an exception to the general release of information if
"specifically exempted from disclosure by statute." Id. § 552(b) (3). Since the Amend-
ments provide that only welfare officials and courts be given access to the information,
the exception is applicable. Another exemption under the Act relates to nondisclosure
of personnel files if a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy is shown. This exemption
might also be effective to prohibit wholesale disclosure of an absent parent's file. ld. §
552(b) (6). See generally Comment, The Freedom of Information Act and Its Internal
Memoranda Exemption: Time for a Practical Approach, 27 Sw. L.J. 806 (1973).
86. 42 U.S.C.A. § 653(f) (Supp. 1976). The pre-existing state programs were
established by 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-06 (1970). See note 8 supra.
87. 42 U.S.C.A. § 653(e)(2) (Supp. 1976). The prior regulations provided safe-
guards which restricted use or disclosure of information about applicants or recipients to
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available through the service is that national security or highly confidential
material such as census data may not be divulged.88 Local or state officials
with support collection responsibility under the program, a court with support
order authority, and the agent of a deserted child not on welfare all have
authority to request and receive information from the service.89  Other im-
portant provisions of the Amendments include the assignment of family sup-
port rights to the states,90 state use of the Internal Revenue Service to collect
child support payments, 91 garnishment of federal wages, 92 provision for
establishment of paternity, 93 and support collection for non-welfare families. 94
III. PROBLEMS RAISED BY THE AMENDMENTS
The Amendments consolidate heretofore localized collection efforts into a
national bureau and provide strong collection power by allowing officials
seeking to collect support payments access to information contained in Inter-
nal Revenue Service files. They also expand the group of people subject
to the laws since the federal government consents to garnishment of federal
employees' wages to pay overdue child support debts. To a limited extent
the federal courts will now be available to hear suits brought to enforce sup-
port claims. Undoubtedly, centralization of collection efforts and expansion
of facilities to locate absent parents will result in more efficient and, there-
fore, less costly collection services. 95 Moreover, if payments are effectively
collected from runaway parents, the taxpayer should reap a savings in the
form of reduced welfare payments.98 Nevertheless, both President Ford and
purposes directly connected with the administration of AFDC. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (9),
1306(a) (1970). This provision was designed to prevent harrassment of welfare
recipients. 1974 S. REP. 8152. The Amendments were written to make it clear that this
requirement may not be used to prevent qualified public officials from obtaining
information they need to perform such duties as collection of child support. Id.
88. 42 U.S.C.A. § 653(b) (Supp. 1976).
89. Id. § 653(c).
90. Id. H9 656, 602(a)(26).
91. Id. § 652(b). This remedy will be available only if the state can establish to the
satisfaction of HEW that it has made diligent but unsuccessful efforts to collect the
payment through other processes.
92. Id. § 659. Prior to the Amendments the wages of federal employees, including
military personnel, were not subject to attachment for purposes of enforcing a court
order for child support. This exemption is based on the immunity of the United States
(and hence its employees) from suits to which it has not consented. 1974 S. REP. 8157.
93. 42 U.S.C.A. § 652(a)(1) (Supp. 1976). "[Aln AFDC child has a right to
have its paternity ascertained in a fair and efficient manner unless identification of the
father is clearly against the best interests of the child." 1974 S. REP. 8154-55. See
notes 116-21 infra.
94. 42 U.S.C.A. § 654(6) (Supp. 1976). Although the Amendments are designed
primarily to improve state programs for collection of child support for welfare recipients,
the Senate Committee realized "the problem of nonsupport is broader than the AFDC
rolls and that many families might be able to avoid the necessity of applying for welfare
in the first place if they had adequate assistance in obtaining the support due from absent
parents." 1974 S. REP. 8158. The Amendments, therefore, provide for location of
absent parents and establishment of paternity for the non-welfare child. A small fee will
be charged for this service.
95. In a study conducted by the National District Attorneys Association it was
reported that if the program is properly implemented by prosecutors, "taxpayers can get
a return of at least $5.05 on every dollar spent to track down runaway welfare parents."
Dallas Times Herald, Oct. 5, 1975, at 16, col. 11.
96. HEW estimates the new legislation could save taxpayers one billion dollars per
year in welfare payments. Id.
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members of Congress have questioned whether the benefits of the new pro-
gram are worth the cost.97 Their concern focuses on what they see as over-
reaching by the federal government into areas traditionally controlled by the
states. In addition, they fear the Amendments will fail to protect the best
interests of the child and the deserting parent's right of privacy.
A. Improper Federal Intervention
The Amendments provide for use of the Internal Revenue Service to
collect child support payments when a state has diligently but unsuccessfully
tried to collect from the parent. 98 The IRS is certainly one of the most effec-
tive collection agencies available to the Government since it has already
established collection procedures and since it could collect the support pay-
ments concurrently with taxes due from the obligor. The procedure is not
revolutionary because the IRS already collects social security payments along
with withholding taxes due from an employee.99 That type of collection,
however, is related directly to the employment of the obligor whereas the col-
lection of child support is based upon a court order. It has been argued that
the IRS was not created to collect judgments; its function is to collect taxes
only.100 In view of the extreme difficulty the states are having with their
collection procedures, however, Congress felt justified in expanding the
authority and power of the IRS to include collection of defaults of child
support payments. Any possibility of undue harassment is significantly
reduced by specific safeguards designed to protect the parent from overbear-
ing tax collection methods. 101
Congress also extended the control of the federal government by providing
the federal courts with jurisdiction to enforce delinquent orders for child
support without regard to any amount in controversy.' 02 The Amendments
97. See H.R. 8598, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); PRESMENTAL DOCUMENTS, supra
note 13, at 20. H.R. 8598 was passed by the House on July 21, 1975. No Senate action
had been taken on the bill, however, by Aug. 1, 1975, the effective date of the
Amendments. The sponsors of the bill had encouraged speedy action by the Senate
because many states faced the loss of matching federal funds for not having a proper
program organized by the time the legislation went into effect. In order to give the
states more time to pass enacting legislation the House proposed that any state making a
good faith effort to comply would not be penalized. H.R. 8598, supra, § 404(c).
98. 42 U.S.C.A. § 652(b) (Supp. 1976). See also 26 U.S.C.A. § 6305 (Supp.
1976) which amends the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and provides the mecha-
nism whereby the child support obligation is collected. The Code treats the obligation
as if it were a tax except that no interest or penalties are assessed.
99. The Federal Insurance Contributions Act provisions are found in 26 U.S.C. §
3101-25 (1970). The IRS collects the employment tax as if it were income tax. Id. §
3501.
100. 121 CONG. REc. 7141 (daily ed. July 21, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Corman).
101. The Amendments provide that in all cases efforts must be made by the states to
collect using their own mechanisms, and the IRS is only the final source of relief. 42
U.S.C.A. § 652(b) (Supp. 1976). A court order must exist for the support obligation
before the IRS may be utilized. Id. Further, the assessment by the IRS will "not
preclude any legal, equitable, or administrative action against the State by any individual
. . . to determine his liability . . . or to recover any such amount collected from him."
26 U.S.C.A. § 6305(b) (Supp. 1976).
102. 42 U.S.C.A. § 660 (Supp. 1976). H.R. 8598 urges repeal of this section because
the federal courts are already too crowded. See 121 CoNo. REC. 7142 (daily ed. July 21,
1975) (remarks of Rep. Vander Jagt).
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provide that support rights must be assigned to the state; 03 upon nonpayment
of child support the dependent's state is entitled to request aid in collecting
the payments from the state to which the parent fled.104  If the state is
uncooperative, the Amendments permit the originating state to file a com-
plaint with the Secretary, who will authorize access to the federal courts to
aid in enforcement of the order.10 5 This provision considerably alleviates the
problems arising from unsympathetic state courts in the parent's new state.' 06
Certainly, if the broad policies promoted by Congress to solve the child
support problem are to be effective, enforcement of support orders must be
facilitated once the absent parent is located.
In addition to allowing use of the federal tax collection mechanism and
more effective use of the federal courts to collect overdue child support, Con-
gress also provided a closely controlled program which the states must imple-
ment to be eligible for federal funds. 10 7 The program will be audited
annually'08 and will be under the supervision of an HEW appointee.' 09
Since the states had in the past been allowed to set up their own programs,
this federal supervision has been criticized." 0 The states have generally had
the responsibility for enforcing child support orders for two reasons: (1) the
dependent's state has a greater interest in protecting its citizen than does
another state; and (2) the deserted parties, if not supported by the absent
parent, may become public charges who must be supported by the local com-
munity."' These reasons were sufficient to leave enforcement to the states
prior to the entry of the federal government into welfare areas in the 1930's.
Since that time, however, it has been established that welfare and social
security programs administered by the federal government are constitu-
tional" 2 and that the federal government, as a condition for payment of
matching funds, may require a state to conform to federal standards." 3
Thus, the federal government clearly has the power to extend federal respon-
sibility for collection efforts. In addition, the vast sums expended for welfare
payments" 4 give the federal government at least as great an interest in the
103. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 656, 602(a) (26) (Supp. 1976).
104. Id. § 652(a)(8).
105. Id.
106. See notes 20-26 supra and accompanying text.
107. 42 U.S.C.A. § 654 (Supp. 1976).
108. Id. §652(a) (4).
109. Id. § 652.
110. See PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 13, at 20. In urging the passage of
the amendments to the Social Services Amendments, Rep. Vander Jagt said that H.R.
8598 corrects oversights in the 1974 Act which would seriously disrupt the AFDC
program and restores to the states their proper role in undertaking child support
activities. 121 CONG. REc. 7142 (daily ed. July 21, 1975).
111. See note 6 supra.
112. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (federal social
security act not invalid as coercive against the states).
113. Guerrero v. Schmidt, 352 F. Supp. 789 (W.D. Wis. 1973); Marotti v. White, 342
F. Supp. 823 (D. Conn. 1972). Upon electing to participate in the federal program the
state must maintain a system consistent with federal legislation on the subject. Rodri-
guez v. Vowell, 472 F.2d 622 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 944 (1973); Reyna v.
Vowell, 470 F.2d 494 (5th Cir. 1972). Further, inconsistent regulations render the
program invalid. Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Grubb v.
Sterrett, 315 F. Supp. 990 (N.D. Ind.), ajf'd, 400 U.S. 922 (1970).
114. "Federal matching for social services prior to ... 1973 was mandatory and
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recipients' well-being as the state where they reside. The state no longer
has the sole responsibility under the Amendments for supporting deserted
dependents. Rather, the federal government will pay seventy-five percent
of the support costs. 115 Since the federal government has such a large
financial stake in the management of matching funds federal intervention to
prescribe standards for state welfare agencies charged with collecting child
support payments is warranted.
B. Cooperation by the Mother in Locating
the Absent Father
The Amendments require, as a condition of eligibility for welfare, that a
mother assign her right to support payments to the state" 6 and cooperate with
state efforts to locate the father." 7 This mandatory cooperation requirement
has been criticized for causing a situation which could "subject the mother
or child to substantial danger or physical harm or undue harrassment." ' 8 A
"good cause" exception has been suggested which would waive the coopera-
tion requirement if, in the judgment of the welfare officer, it is in the best
interest of the child that the father not be named."19 Such a situation could
arise in cases of rape, incest, or threat of harm from an angry father.120  The
inflexible cooperation requirement of the Amendments should be amended
to provide the welfare official with discretion to determine whether disclosure
of the father's identity is in the best interests of the child. Of course such
an amendment must contain explicit guidelines designed to allow the use of
discretion by 'a welfare officer only in cases which merit a waiver of the
cooperation requirement.' 21
open-ended. Every dollar a State spent for social services was matched by three Federal
dollars." 1974 S. REp. 8135. The amount paid by the federal government in 1973 was
estimated to be $4.7 billion. Id.
115. 42 U.S.C.A. § 655 (Supp. 1976).
116. Id. § 656(a).
117. Id. § 602(a)(26)(B). The ineligibility of a non-cooperating mother would
apply only to her and not to her children; assistance payments would be made to the
children under a protective payment plan to assure they get the benefits of such
payments. In the past courts have held that state restrictions which deny the child aid
are invalid as beyond the scope of the Social Security Act. Meyers v. Juras, 327 F.
Supp. 759 (D. Ore.), aff'd, 404 U.S. 803 (1971). See also Saddler v. Winstead, 332 F.
Supp. 130 (N.D. Miss. 1971); Doe v. Schmidt, 330 F. Supp. 159 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
Many cases involve mothers who refuse to comply with welfare department regulations
requiring that they institute an action against the abandoning father. See, e.g., King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (protection of dependent needy children is the paramount
goal of AFDC and, therefore, a state cannot frustrate that goal in the name of the
subservient goal of securing support from the abandoning parent). See also Taylor v.
Martin, 330 F. Supp. 85 (N.D. Cal.), af 'd, 404 U.S. 980 (1971). Similarly, children
are entitled to support although the mother refuses to name the father, Doe v. Shapiro,
302 F, Supp. 761 (D. Conn. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 488 (1970), or refuses to
cooperate in locating the father, Lascaris v. New York State Dep't of Social Services, 67
Misc. 2d 17, 323 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct. 1971). See generally Redlich, Unconstitutional
Conditions on Welfare Eligibility, 1970 Wis. L. REv. 450, 454; Note, Social Security and
Public Welfare: Invalidity of Public Welfare Regulations Requiring Parent to Cooperate
with District Attorney in Obtaining Child Support from Abandoning Parent, 25 OKLA. L.
Rav. 438 (1972).
118. 121 CoNo. REC. 7141 (daily ed. July 21, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Corman). See
also remarks of Rep. Vander Jagt, id. at 7142; remarks of Rep. Fraser, id. at 7143.
119. H.R. 8598, supra note 97, § 7(a).
120. 121 CoNG. REc. 7141 (daily ed. July 21, 1975) (remarks of Rep. Corman).
121. Id. at 7143 (remarks of Rep. Bauman).
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C. Invasion of Privacy
Federal agencies have compiled an estimated 2.8 billion pieces of informa-
tion on individual citizens. 122 While not all files are constantly updated,
some files, such as income tax records and motor vehicle registration files,
are likely to have current information about an individual's whereabouts.
Under the Social Services Amendments the states by use of the federal parent
locator service can obtain access to many of these records. This broad access
to information about a deserting parent may raise serious privacy and
administrative issues. 123
Under prior law information contained in the records of HEW, the Social
Security Administration, and the Internal Revenue Service was made avail-
able to the states upon a court order for support.124 The most useful infor-
mation obtainable through the federal parent locator service is, therefore,
already available on the state level. The service consolidates and centralizes
all location efforts, however, and thereby provides greater efficiency and
economy. 1 5
A state is required to check its own records first. If the individual is not on
file, the state may immediately seek help from the national bureau rather
than request another state to check its files. Properly implemented, the
parent locator service should be able to locate any person who disappears
in order to avoid a child support obligation. The subjugation of the individ-
ual's right to refuse disclosure of confidential information to the goals of
modernization and efficiency has, however, been criticized., 26  It has been
suggested that Congress should rid itself of the "misconception that whatever
technology can produce should be used" and "that whatever is efficient
is desirable.' 27  Simply because the federal government has the resources
to find a deserting parent does not mean it must do so. On the contrary,
a person has the right to make a "fresh start' 128 and "[t]he right to be let
122. As of 1973 the following agencies or departments were compiling files on
individuals: The FBI had more than 17 million personal files; the IRS had a file on
every person filing an income tax return; the House Internal Security Committee had in
1970 a list of 63,000 names on record; the Civil Service Commission had a list of
2,120,000 names in a "security file" with 10,250,000 names in an "index;" the Secret
Service had a list of 100,000 names and 50,000 dossiers; the Department of Defense had
a list of 25,000,000 names; the Army had 7 million files in its investigative records
depository; and the Justice Department had approximately 5 million files. Comment,
The Computer Data Bank-Privacy Controversy Revisited: An Analysis and an Admin-
istrative Proposal, 22 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 628, 640 (1973). See generally Countryman,
The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 TEXAS
L. REv. 837, 854-62 (1971).
123. PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS, supra note 13, at 20.
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-06 (1970).
125. See Comment, Privacy, Law Enforcement and Public Interest: Computerized
Criminal Records, 36 MONTANA L. REV. 60 (1975), for a summary of the values of
centralizing information sources.
126. In response to President Ford's statements about possible invasion of privacy the
House Ways and Means Committee decided to urge reenactment of essentially the same
provisions that were in effect prior to the enactment of the Amendments. H.R. 8598,
supra note 97, § 453. Representative Corman emphasized that prior law represented "a
reasonable compromise between the individual's right to privacy and the needs for
information which exists in the administration of welfare and other programs where
assistance" is based on financial need. 121 CONG. Rc. 7141 (daily ed. July 21, 1975).
127. Countryman, supra note 122, at 869.




Constitutional Right of Privacy. Privacy is an elusive concept which has only
recently been granted constitutional status by the Supreme Court.'8 0 The
Constitution does not explicitly provide a right of privacy. Acquisition of
information about an individual may, however, constitute a violation of the
first amendment's protection of free speech and association, 13 1 the fourth
amendment's protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, 182 the
fifth amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination,'8 3 and the fourteenth
amendment's due process protection. 34
In Griswold v. Connecticut 3 5 the Court described privacy as a right which
"emanates" from certain "zones of privacy" and which is to be protected
start anew with society being able to "forgive and forget." See The Computerization of
Government Files: What Impact on the Individual?, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1374, 1414-15
(1968).
129. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing).
130. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Connecticut anti-contraception
law violated privacy of married person). See notes 135-41 infra and accompanying text.
To be distinguished from the constitutional right of privacy established in Griswold is the
common law tort of invasion of privacy. See Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). Currently four types of invasion have been described:(1) intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing
private facts about another; (3) appropriation of another's name or likeness; (4)
publicity which unreasonably places the plaintiff in a false light before the public. W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971). The Restatement of
Torts divides privacy into four branches in much the way Prosser does. RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS, §§ 652A-E (Tent. Draft No. 13, 1967). See also F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 96, at 682 (1956).
131. Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-64 (1958).
132. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949), in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter
commented: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society." See also
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (right of privacy forbids unrestrained search and
seizure). In Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), the Court held that
tapping of a telephone was not a violation of fourth amendment rights because a physical
intrusion and seizure of material was necessary for an actionable constitutional violation.
However, Justice Brandeis in his dissent gave privacy its most quoted judicial recognition
when he stated that the framers of the Constitution had "conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the
Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 478. Olmstead was overruled in
1967 in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), which established the principle that
no physical intrusion is necessary for violation of the fourth amendment.
133. Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966). In referring to the privacy element of the
fourth and fifth amendments the Court has said: "It is not the breaking of his doors,
and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offense; but it is
the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private
property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public
offense,-it is the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the
essence of [the] judgment." Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885).
134. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment may be violated if the
acquisition of information about an individual occurs without prior notification to the
individual. "Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake
because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard
are essential." Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). See also Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (due process clause incorporates the spirit of the
fourteenth amendment, making it binding on the states although not to the same extent
the federal government is bound).
135. 381 US. 479 (1965).
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under the "penumbra" of the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amend-
ments. 136 Mr. Justice Goldberg in a concurring opinion asserted that privacy
is a fundamental right which is entitled to constitutional protection even
though it is not explicitly mentioned in the Bill of Rights. 137 He deemed
privacy a fundamental personal liberty since it emanates " 'from the totality
of the constitutional scheme under which we live.' "1138 Since privacy is a
fundamental right, a state may not regulate an activity merely by exhibiting
a rational relationship between the regulation and the effectuation of a proper
state purpose.139 Rather, to regulate an activity the state must show a com-
pelling state interest.' 40 In Griswold Mr. Justice Goldberg did not find that
the state had the requisite interest in regulation; the anti-contraception law
was "'merely rationally related to the accomplishment of a permissible state
policy.' ",141 The state, therefore, had no constitutional power to regulate it.
In Roe v. Wade'42 the Court declared that an expectant mother's right of
privacy prevents a state from denying her an abortion.143 The Court, how-
ever, stated that this right is not absolute since at some point in the woman's
pregnancy the state's interest in protecting the life of the mother and fetus
becomes compelling. The state's interest will then outweigh the woman's
right of privacy and her request for an abortion may be refused.' 44 The
136. Id. at 484.
137. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). The fifth and fourteenth amendments
"protect certain fundamental personal liberties from abridgement by the Federal Govern-
ment or the States." Id. at 492. Mr. Justice Goldberg argues that by the ninth
amendment fundamental rights may exist even though they are not explicitly mentioned
in the Bill of Rights. The right of privacy is such a fundamental right. Id. at 493.
138. Id. at 494, quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
The Court should look to "'the traditions and [collective] conscience'" of the people to
determine whether a principle is fundamental. 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concur-
ring), quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See also Tribe,
Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L.
REV. 1, 42-44 (1973).
139. 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
140. Id., quoting Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960).
141. 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring), quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
142. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
143. ld. at 154. Mr. Justice Rehnquist says Griswold and Roe speak to special types
of privacy-that is, they bar legislative regulation of an entire area of conduct. The
relationships involved in these two cases were thought to be sufficiently intimate that the
government is prohibited from substantively regulating them. This is contrasted to what
Rehnquist calls the "core area" of privacy, the restraint on government action embodied
in the fourth amendment. This "core area" involves an area the individual has chosen to
keep private and away from prying eyes. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy
Consistent with Fair and Effective Enforcement? or: Privacy, You've Come a Long
Way, Baby, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 3-5 (1974).
144. 410 U.S. at 154. The Court held that "the State does have an important and
legitimate interest in preserving and protecting the health of the pregnant woman," and
also that the state "has still another important and legitimate interest in protecting the
potentiality of human life." Id. at 162. These interests are separate and distinct but
"each becomes compelling" as the woman approaches term. Id. at 163. The Court
determined at precisely what point the state may intervene: (1) until the end of the first
trimester the abortion decision must be left up to the woman and her physician; (2) after
the first trimester the state may regulate abortion procedures to protect the mother's
health; (3) at viability (around seven months) the state may regulate or even proscribe
abortion to protect its interest in the fetus. Id. at 164-65. Thus, the Court balanced the
beneficial and harmful consequences of state regulation of abortion and determined that
the constitutional result differed from trimester to trimester. The Court was not choos-
ing between pregnancy and abortion so much as it was deciding who should make the
decision, the woman or the state. Tribe, supra note 138, at 10-11. It has been suggested
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Court found another basis for limiting the right of privacy in Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn.145 In Cohn the Court found a rape victim's right to con-
fidentiality was restricted by the first amendment right of freedom of the press
and the right of the public to be informed, at least when the information is
obtainable from the public files. 146
Data Banks. With the invention of the computer, the right of privacy took
on a new dimension since information concerning an individual became
almost instantly accessible. The National Crime Information Center
(NCIC), created in 1971, provides a centralized source of information for
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 47  The NCIC has been criticized for
the laxity with which it allows release of information and because many of
the records which it maintains are thought to be unnecessary. 148 Although
courts have traditionally been unwilling to interfere with the handling of
criminal data because its availability is necessary for effective law-enforce-
ment,' 49 courts have recently been willing to take notice of disabilities result-
that in substantive due process cases such as Roe a workable approach is to use a "role-
allocation" model. Using this type of analysis "the Court may determine that the due
process clause is violated whenever the state either assumes a role the Constitution
entrusts to another, or fails to assume a role the Constitution imposes upon it." Id. at
15. Use of this method involves balancing interests as the Court did in Roe, but only
those interests directly influencing the allocation of roles. Id. at 51. That is, the Court
should focus on the various interests of the state, church, father, and mother, as opposed
to deciding the pros and cons of early abortion. In cases involving the right of privacy
of a deserting parent the Court might decide that the role of locating the deserter should
not, as a general matter, be reposed in the government.
145. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
146. Id. at 487-97. In this case the victim's father sued, contending the public
broadcast of his daughter's name violated his right of privacy. The Court ruled that a
state statute which makes it a misdemeanor to broadcast a rape victim's name is
unconstitutional. Id. at 491. See also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), in which
the Court overturned a lower court's award of $30,000 in damages for invasion of privacy
for erroneously identifying plaintiff as the subject of a controversial play. The Court
declared that without proof that the defendant made a statement with knowledge of its
falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth, there can be no invasion of privacy.
147. The NCIC is tied to twenty-four computerized terminals throughout the country
and contains more than 1.7 million personal files and more than 195 million sets of
fingerprints. Countryman, supra note 122, at 854-56; see Comment, Protection of
Privacy of Computerized Records in the National Crime Information Center, 7 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 594 (1974). Benefits from the national center include on-the-spot infor-
mation concerning persons and objects; this gives the investigating officers an opportuni-
ty they otherwise would not have to arrest or confiscate. A major cost of the system is
the ease with which unauthorized persons can receive the information. Id. at 595-97.
See generally A. WESTIM, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 23-26 (1967).
148. See Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718 (D.D.C. 1971) (if arrest is made with
probable cause but suspect is exonerated, the FBI may have the duty to note the
exoneration on its files). See also United States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968 (D.P.R.
1967); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211 (1971). For commentaries on
these cases see Steele, A Suggested Legislative Device for Dealing with Abuses of
Criminal Records, 6 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 32 (1972); Comment, Branded: Arrest
Records of the Unconvicted, 44 Miss. L.J. 928 (1973); Comment, Retention and
Dissemination of Arrest Records: Judicial Response, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 850 (1971).
But see Rehnquist, supra note 143, at 8, in which the author suggests the central question
is the use to which the record will be put. Since an arrest is not a "private" event (that
is, it is a matter of public record) it is not an invasion of privacy to keep a record of the
event. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (an
abortion is not "private" in the ordinary usage of the word). However, the citizen should
be able in certain circumstances to demand eradication or limited disclosure of the
information, at least if no conviction is made. Rehnquist, supra note 143, at 8.
149. Believing that the plaintiff's right to privacy is not outweighed by the need for
law enforcement officials to have complete files so they will recognize potential crimi-
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ing from criminal record disclosures.1 50 These disabilities include injury to
an individual's reputation and serious economic loss. 151 Some courts have
suggested there be greater sanctions against improper use of the material in
the NCIC as well as more administrative safeguards against its dissemina-
tion.152
Congress also took note of the problem of invasion of privacy when it
refused to authorize creation of the National Data Bank (NDB) proposed
by the Bureau of the Budget. 15 3 Governmental agencies traditionally remain
independent in their information gathering, and their use of computers is gen-
erally internal to each agency. The NDB would have collected all informa-
tion from twenty federal agencies in one centralized, efficient unit. Due to
the great number of congressional hearings on the subject, the NDB was
never established. Congress obtained from the Bureau of the Budget a com-
mitment that before a central data bank would be established, the problems
of invasion of privacy would be evaluated by a panel of experts including
lawyers, computer experts, and representatives of Congress. M4
Both the NDB and the NCIC involve the idea of centralizing all records
into one huge complex, with computers transmitting information instantane-
ously. The parent locator service, on the other hand, merely provides access
to the information contained in government files.' 55 The Amendments do
not explicitly authorize creation of a data bank to disseminate the informa-
tion.' 56 It could be argued, therefore, that since the information is properly
filed in another agency's records dissemination by a federal locator service
is not an invasion of privacy of the type involved in gargantuan "Big Brother"
data banks. It has been suggested, however, that if one bureau is allowed
access to another's files, a data center could come into existence in fact, if
nals, courts have often refused to grant any relief citing a lack of statutory authority.
See, e.g., Purdy v. Mulkey, 228 So. 2d 132 (Fla. 1969); Fernicola v. Keenan, 136 N.J.
Eq. 9, 39 A.2d 851 (Ch. 1944). Another reason courts have denied plaintiffs relief has
been that there was no injury. See, e.g., Hershal v. Drya, 365 F.2d 17 (7th Cir. 1966).
150. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Morrow v. District
of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 741-43 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
151. Menard v. Mitchell, 430 F.2d 486, 490 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
152. Menard v. Mitchell, 328 F. Supp. 718, 726-27 (D.D.C. 1971). Suggestions have
been made concerning specific approaches to the problem of safeguarding the functions
of the computer bank itself. Included are controls on data bank content which would
limit the acquisition and maintenance of certain types of data, ensure accuracy of data,
and provide that certain types of records be expunged. See note 168 infra and
accompanying text.
153. See generally Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights
Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); Hearings on the Computer and Invasion of Privacy Before
the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
See also Countryman, supra note 122, at 862; Comment, supra note 122; Note, Privacy
and Efficient Government: Proposals for a National Data Bank Center, 82 HARV. L.
REv. 400 (1968).
154. H.R. REP. No. 1842, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-23 (1968).
155. 42 U.S.C.A. § 653 (Supp. 1976).
156. On the other hand, they do not prohibit the creation of a data bank. The
section of the Amendments which establishes the parent locator service merely provides
that the Secretary of HEW shall "establish and conduct a Parent Locator Service . . . to
obtain and transmit . . . information as to the whereabouts of any absent parent," such
information to be obtained from the files of HEW or any other agency. 42 U.S.C.A. § §
653(a), (b) (Supp. 1976).
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not in name. 157 Congress continues to be concerned about this problem and
has suggested abolishing the parent locator service because it presents the
opportunity for invasion of privacy on an unprecedented scale. 158
Balancing Interests. Both Congress and the courts recognize a constitutional
right of privacy; similarly, both recognize the need to retain a centralized data
bank like the NCIC in order to facilitate crime prevention. In many instances,
however, these interests will be in direct conflict. Increased privacy may mean
less effective enforcement of the law" 9 or a less-informed citizenry. 160 Cer-
tainly no one denies that children should be supported by their parents. Not
only will deserted children be psychologically upset by the parent's disappear-
ance but in many instances they will be destitute and forced to accept state aid.
Clearly, then, the state has a legitimate interest in locating the parent;
contribution to a child's support by a parent reduces the state's burden. The
problem is whether that interest should prevail over the parent's constitution-
ally protected right of privacy.' 6' Improperly managed, the parent locator
service might inhibit a person's right to travel as he pleases or the right to
refuse disclosure of confidential information to a casual inquirer. Although
privacy is a fundamental right as established in Griswold and Roe, it is not
an absolute right.'6 2 A showing that the state has a compelling interest in
the challenged regulation may supersede the right.163 The Court in Roe, for
example, said the state has a compelling interest past a certain point in the
woman's pregnancy to protect mother and child. This interest overcomes the
constitutionally protected right of privacy. Similarly, states have an interest
in assuring that their citizens receive adequate maintenance, 6 4 and a law
which permits the states to find absent parents for the purpose of enforcing
a child support order is "not merely rationally related, to the accomplishment
of a permissible state policy."' 1 5 Rather, such a law is "necessary" to the
valid state policy of aiding a dependent's collection of child support. With-
out such provisions it would often be impossible to locate a clever parent who
has fled the state without leaving an easily ascertainable record of his where-
abouts.' 66 In this case the state's interest should be defined as compelling
and should, therefore, supersede the deserting parent's right of privacy.
157. Countryman, supra note 122, at 867.
158. H.R. 8598, supra note 97, at 7141 (remarks of Rep. Corman).
159. An example is the exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)
(evidence improperly obtained may not be used at trial).
160. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
161. Conflicting cases should be "carefully analyzed not only in terms of the values
they would advance but in terms of the values they-would displace." Rehnquist, supra
note 143, at 3. There appears to be an "inverse correlation between increasing
governmental regulation and more governmental benefit programs on the one hand, and
privacy enjoyed by the individuals who live under those governments on the other. This
is a natural, if not inevitable, consequence of the vast expansion of the role of
government." Id. at 17..
162. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
163. Id. See also note 144 supra and accompanying text.
164. See note 6 supra.
165. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). See also note 141 supra and
accompanying text.
166. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964).
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Simply, for the state to assume the "role" of locator in nonsupport cases is
constitutionally permissible. 167
Safeguarding Privacy. Although the possibility for abuse of the parent
locator service is present in the Amendments, a few minor changes would
be sufficient to guard against indiscriminate release of information about a
deserting parent. Such changes might include the following: (1) when
information is disclosed, the recipient agency must not make a further dis-
closure of the information except as it relates specifically to parent location;
(2) the programs which can disclose information and the agencies which can
receive this information must be precisely and completely delineated by the
Secretary of HEW; (3) eligibility of agencies to receive information should
be conditioned upon their standards of disclosure and confidentiality; and (4)
an individual's access to his own files for the purpose of correcting erroneous
information should be permitted. 168 While these changes in the Amend-
ments would not entirely dispel the threat of invasion of privacy, they would
still enable the parent locator service to find a parent who has committed
a crime by refusing to support his minor child.
IV. PRACTICALITY OF THE AMENDMENTS
Under prior law the states had access to Social Security and Internal
Revenue records.'6 9 If it is impossible to locate an absent parent through
either of these two methods, it is unlikely he will be employed. If he is not
employed, he will probably not have the financial capacity to pay child
support, no matter how strong his moral and legal obligation may be. Thus,
the only reason to locate him would be to imprison or harass him. 170
Although this may be what he deserves for nonsupport, 171 a careful reading
of the legislative history of the Amendments provides ample proof that Con-
gress did not merely wish to locate debtors to harass them. On the contrary,
Congress' goal is to have deserted children supported by the deserting
parent. 72 Location merely for harassment is a waste of time, effort, and
the taxpayers' money. Imprisonment would cost even more since then the
taxpayer would be supporting both the parent and child. Therefore, it is
arguable that the Amendments are useless, at least for the purpose of enforc-
ing child support obligations from the lower income parents whose children
make up the bulk of welfare recipients.173
The parent locator service will be very effective in coercing middle-income
parents to fulfill their obligations.' 7 4 A middle-income parent is almost cer-
167. See Tribe, supra note 138. See also note 144 supra.
168. H.R. 8598, supra note 97, at 7143 (remarks of Rep. Koch). See also Country-
man, supra note 122.
169. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-06 (1970).
170. See Willging & Ellsmore, supra note 18.
171. Id.
172. 1974 S. REP. 8158.
173. Id. at 8145-46.
174. The Senate Report emphasizes the "number of well-off physicians and attorneys
whose families ultimately are forced onto welfare because of insufficient mechanisms for
enforcement of obligations to support. [This situation is due] to the difficulty of
proving the income of the self-employed, the ease with which unwilling fathers can
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tain to seek and find employment in his new location. As a result, his name
will appear on the records available to the parent locator service. After his
dependents assign their right to support to the state, the state can sue the
absent parent in federal court to collect overdue payments.175 If he refuses
to pay, then the IRS collection mechanism may be implemented. 1.7 6 If he
is a federal employee, his wages may be garnished. 177 In other words, the
Amendments will help dependents of a middle-income parent obtain the
support to which they are legally entitled. Such potentially differing results
suggest that the Social Services Amendments of 1974 are class legislation
directed at the middle and upperclass parent, yet worded to encompass any
parent who defaults on child support payments. The Amendments are more
a policy statement against the evils of defaulting on child support obligations
than a successful method by which all deserted children are assured support
by their parents, many of whom are, in fact, scarcely able to support
themselves.
V. CONCLUSION
By enacting the Social Services Amendments of 1974 Congress recognized
the morass in laws concerning child support. The child has a right to be
supported and the taxpayers have a right to expect the child's parent to sup-
port him. Traditional methods of enforcing child support obligations such as
enactment of long-arm statutes and the use of the Uniform Reciprocal
Enforcement of Support Act are not workable due to the expense and lack
of interest on the part of other states. Further, they are not usable when
a missing parent cannot be found. State procedures to locate the absent
parent are not efficient and are not often used. The Social Services Amend-
ments of 1974 attempt to consolidate efforts to locate the deserter and
provide strong tools to enforce the support obligation once he is located. Al-
though the federal government is intervening in what has traditionally been
a state's concern, this intervention is justified by the national government's
interest in the deserted child who will be supported through federal tax
dollars if his parent is not located. If appropriate safeguards are imple-
mented, the parent's right of privacy will not be impermissibly violated. The
Amendments cannot, as a practical matter, greatly reduce the amount paid
to welfare children because most deserting parents do not have the funds to
assume the support obligation. However, they represent congressional
awareness of a steadily growing problem and a first step toward assuring that
parents capable of supporting their children will fulfill that obligation.
conceal their assets, the statutory barrier to collecting from military personnel and
Federal employees, and the low priority given child support investigations by under-
staffed district attorney's offices." Id. at 8147.
175. See notes 102-06 supra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 98-101 supra and accompanying text.
177. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
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